{"title":"Economic Learning And Social Evolution","description":null,"products":[{"product_id":"moral-sentiments-and-material-interests-book-herbert-gintis-9780262072526","title":"Moral Sentiments and Material Interests","description":null,"brand":"WoB","offers":[{"title":"GB \/ VERY_GOOD \/ INTERNAL","offer_id":49613039239441,"sku":"GOR013612388","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0784\/4072\/6801\/files\/0262072521.jpg?v=1786108066"},{"product_id":"evolutionary-games-and-equilibrium-selection-book-larry-samuelson-9780262193825","title":"Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection","description":"\u003cp\u003e\u003cb\u003eThe author examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games.\u003c\/b\u003e\u003c\/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eEvolutionary game theory is one of the most active and rapidly growing areas of research in economics. Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. After providing an overview of the basic issues of game theory and a presentation of the basic models, the book addresses evolutionary stability, the dynamics of sample paths, the ultimatum game, drift, noise, backward and forward induction, and strict Nash equilibria.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"WoB","offers":[{"title":"GB \/ GOOD \/ INTERNAL","offer_id":49628421587217,"sku":"GOR010195129","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false},{"title":"US \/ GOOD \/ SBYB","offer_id":53707758010641,"sku":"CIN0262193825G","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0784\/4072\/6801\/files\/0262193825.jpg?v=1751037745"},{"product_id":"theory-of-learning-in-games-book-drew-fudenberg-9780262061940","title":"The Theory of Learning in Games","description":"\u003cp\u003eIn economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games, especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. 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Unlike traditional game theory models, which assume that all players are fully rational and have complete knowledge of details of the game, evolutionary models assume that people choose their strategies through a trial-and-error learning process in which they gradually discover that some strategies work better than others. In games that are repeated many times, low-payoff strategies tend to be weeded out, and an equilibrium may emerge. Larry Samuelson has been one of the main contributors to the evolutionary game theory literature. In Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, he examines the interplay between evolutionary game theory and the equilibrium selection problem in noncooperative games. 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Evolutionary game theory, which studies the behavior of large populations of strategically interacting agents, is used by economists to make predictions in settings where traditional assumptions about agents' rationality and knowledge may not be justified. Recently, computer scientists, transportation scientists, engineers, and control theorists have also turned to evolutionary game theory, seeking tools for modeling dynamics in multiagent systems. \u003ci\u003ePopulation Games and Evolutionary Dynamics\u003c\/i\u003e provides a point of entry into the field for researchers and students in all of these disciplines. The text first considers population games, which provide a simple, powerful model for studying strategic interactions among large numbers of anonymous agents. 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