Human Knowing by James W Felt
Human Knowing is a clearly written, brief introduction that guides the reader through an exploration of sense perception, ordinary knowing, scientific knowing, and philosophic knowing. This journey culminates in a justification of philosophy as a genuine form of knowing and thus a natural prelude to metaphysics. Though Felt manages to avoid technical language, the development of his argument is a genuine exercise in philosophic thinking. The outcome is a contemporary expression of a position similar to that of Thomas Aquinas, significantly enriched by insights from Bergson, Whitehead, and phenomenology. This book is accessible, smart, and refreshing. Any interested general reader or student will profit from reading it.“This fine book is ideal for introductory courses in philosophy, and it is executed and backed up by careful, sophisticated philosophical analysis and insight” —W. Norris Clarke, S.J., Fordham University
“A strong case for relational realism is presented with a carefully outlined argument and discussion of classic examples from many major philosophers, including Locke, Hume, Kant, Searle, Merleau-Ponty, Kuhn, Whitehead, and Aquinas. Numerous analogies from common experience and chapter review questions are provided (plus a dab of humor and poetry). Felt successfully proves with his relational realism that we are not, as some philosophers might call us, merely meat-robots.” —Dialogue
“. . . [T]his is an engaging work--bright, readable, and tightly argued. It should serve as a fine undergraduate introduction to epistemology.” —The Review of Metaphysics
James W. Felt, S.J., is John Nobili Professor of Philosophy at Santa Clara University.
| SKU | Nicht verfügbar |
| ISBN 13 | 9780268028794 |
| ISBN 10 | 0268028796 |
| Titel | Human Knowing |
| Autor | James W Felt |
| Buchzustand | Nicht verfügbar |
| Bindungsart | Paperback |
| Verlag | University of Notre Dame Press |
| Erscheinungsjahr | 2005-09-30 |
| Seitenanzahl | 140 |
| Hinweis auf dem Einband | Die Abbildung des Buches dient nur Illustrationszwecken, die tatsächliche Bindung, das Cover und die Auflage können sich davon unterscheiden. |
| Hinweis | Nicht verfügbar |