Kantian Humility by Rae Langton

Kantian Humility by Rae Langton

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Zusammenfassung

An interpretation and defence of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Langton argues that his claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but epistemic humility: we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances.

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Kantian Humility by Rae Langton

Rae Langton offers a new interpretation and defence of Kant's doctrine of things in themselves. Kant distinguishes things in themselves from phenomena, and in so doing he makes a metaphysical distinction between intrinsic and relational properties of substances. Kant says that phenomena--things as we know them--consist 'entirely of relations'. His claim that we have no knowledge of things in themselves is not idealism, but epistemic humility: we have no knowledge of the intrinsic properties of substances. This humility has its roots in some plausible philosophical beliefs: an empiricist belief in the receptivity of human knowledge and a metaphysical belief in the irreducibility of relational properties. Langton's interpretation vindicates Kant's scientific realism, and shows his primary/secondary quality distinction to be superior even to modern-day competitors. And it answers the famous charge that Kant's tale of things in themselves is one that makes itself untellable.
a novel attempt to elucidate and defend a central Kantian thesis.. a most interesting, impressive, and scholarly exercise in Kantian interpretation * P. F. Strawson *
Rae Langton is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.
SKU Nicht verfügbar
ISBN 13 9780199243174
ISBN 10 0199243174
Titel Kantian Humility
Autor Rae Langton
Buchzustand Nicht verfügbar
Bindungsart Paperback
Verlag Oxford University Press
Erscheinungsjahr 2001-01-18
Seitenanzahl 246
Hinweis auf dem Einband Die Abbildung des Buches dient nur Illustrationszwecken, die tatsächliche Bindung, das Cover und die Auflage können sich davon unterscheiden.
Hinweis Nicht verfügbar