
Naturally Minded by Simon Bowes
This book is an empirically informed investigation of the philosophical problem of mental causation, and a philosophical investigation of the status of cognitive scientific generalisations. If there are mental causes which can be classified in a way useful for predicting and explaining, then they are natural kinds. First. we develop an account of natural kinds that accommodates the cognitive. Second, we show how statements using these are not reducible to statements about physical kinds, involving biological and social facts. Finally, Virtual Machine Functionalism is defended as the correct account of the relationship between cognition and the material world.
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Thought-Shaping, Enactivism, and Embodied Habits of Mind
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Enactive Cognition in Place
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Philosophy and Neuroscience
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The Philosophy of Affordances
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Neurofeminism
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Action, Perception and the Brain
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Nietzsche's Dynamic Metapsychology
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A Neurophenomenology of Awe and Wonder
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Challenging the Phenomena of Technology
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The Embodied Philosopher
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Phenomenology of Psychedelic Experiences
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Neuroscience, Neurophilosophy and Pragmatism
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Cognitive Integration
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Love and Selfhood
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Enactive Cognition at the Edge of Sense-Making
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Normativity in Perception
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Rethinking Introspection
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Embodiment, Emotion, and Cognition
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4E Cognitive Science and Wittgenstein
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Extending the Extended Mind
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The Neurodynamic Soul
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Knowing without Thinking
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Keeping the World in Mind
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Structuring the Self
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The Renaissance Extended Mind
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Rethinking Commonsense Psychology
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Challenges of the Technological Mind
| SKU | Unavailable |
| ISBN 13 | 9783031369322 |
| Title | Naturally Minded |
| Author | Simon Bowes |
| Series | New Directions In Philosophy And Cognitive Science |
| Condition | Unavailable |
| Binding Type | Paperback |
| Publisher | Springer International Publishing AG |
| Year published | 2024-08-14 |
| Number of pages | 244 |
| Cover note | Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary. |
| Note | Unavailable |


























