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The Myth of Democratic Failure By Donald A. Wittman

The Myth of Democratic Failure
by Donald A. Wittman

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£5.49
A text seeking to refute one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economic markets are more efficient than the processes and institutions of democratic government.
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The Myth of Democratic Failure Summary


The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient by Donald A. Wittman

This is a text seeking to refute one of the cornerstone beliefs of economics and political science: that economic markets are more efficient than the processes and institutions of democratic government. The author first considers the characteristic of efficient markets - informed, rational participants competing for well-defined and easily transferred property rights - and explains how they operate in democratic politics. He then analyzes how specific political institutions are organized to operate efficiently. "Markets" such as the the Congress in the United States, bureaucracies, and pressure groups, the author asserts contribute to efficient political outcomes. He also provides a theory of institutional design to explain how these political "markets" arise. Finally, Wittman addresses the methodological shortcomings of analyses of political market failure, and offers his own suggestions for a more effective research strategy. Ultimately, the study concludes that nearly all of the arguments claiming that economic markets are efficient apply equally well to democratic political markets; and, conversely, that economic models of political failure are not more valid than the analogous arguments for economic market failure.

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Table of Contents


Acknowledgments 1: Introduction: The Market Metaphor 2: The Informed Voter 3: Electoral-Market Competition and the Control of Opportunistic Behavior 4: Transaction Costs and the Design of Government institutions 5: Homo Economicus versus Homo Psychologicus: Why Cognitive Psychology Does Not Explain Democratic Politics 6: Legislative Markets and Organization 7: Pressure Groups 8: Bureaucratic Markets: Why Government Bureaucracies Are Efficient and Not Too Large 9: The Market for Regulation 10: The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract and the Role of Transaction Costs in Constitutional Design 11: Majority Rule and Preference Aggregation 12: The Distribution of Economic Wealth and Political Power 13: The Testing of Theory 14: Epilogue: The Burden of Proof References Author Index Subject index

Additional information

GOR004429308
The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient by Donald A. Wittman
Donald A. Wittman
American Politics & Political Economy S.
Used - Very Good
Paperback
The University of Chicago Press
1996-12-11
230
0226904237
9780226904238
N/A
Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary.
This is a used book - there is no escaping the fact it has been read by someone else and it will show signs of wear and previous use. Overall we expect it to be in very good condition, but if you are not entirely satisfied please get in touch with us.