{"title":"Robert J Aumann","description":null,"products":[{"product_id":"interactive-epistemology-book-robert-j-aumann-9789811227325","title":"Interactive Epistemology","description":"Robert J Aumann has received numerous prizes, including the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for 2005.With his 1976 paper, 'Agreeing to Disagree', Robert Aumann pioneered the subject of interactive epistemology: the study of what people know, and what they know about what others know. Since then, the discipline has burgeoned enormously. This book documents Aumann's work leading to the 1976 paper and his subsequent contributions to the discipline. The scientific controversies emanating from his work are also included.","brand":"WoB","offers":[{"title":"GB \/ NEW \/ GARDNERS","offer_id":50463862817041,"sku":"NGR9789811227325","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false},{"title":"US \/ NEW \/ INGRAM","offer_id":51066410893585,"sku":"NIN9789811227325","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false},{"title":"GB \/ NEW \/ INGRAM","offer_id":52407159128337,"sku":"NLS9789811227325","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0784\/4072\/6801\/files\/9811227322.jpg?v=1751097763"},{"product_id":"values-of-non-atomic-games-book-robert-j-aumann-9780691618463","title":"Values of Non-Atomic Games","description":"The \"Shapley value\" of a finite multi- person game associates to each player the amount he should be willing to pay to participate. This book extends the value concept to certain classes of non-atomic games, which are infinite-person games in which no individual player has significance. It is primarily a book of mathematics--a study of non-additive set functions and associated linear operators.  Originally published in 1974.  The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.","brand":"WoB","offers":[{"title":"- \/ - \/ -","offer_id":51005838065937,"sku":"","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true},{"title":"US \/ NEW \/ INGRAM","offer_id":51005841375505,"sku":"NIN9780691618463","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0784\/4072\/6801\/files\/0691618461.jpg?v=1750743126"},{"product_id":"selected-contributions-to-game-theory-book-robert-j-aumann-9789811221064","title":"Selected Contributions To Game Theory","description":"Robert Aumann was awarded (jointly with Thomas C Schelling) the 2005 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 'for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis'. This book contains ten of his most important contributions to game theory, as selected by Eric Maskin, also a Nobel laureate.","brand":"WoB","offers":[{"title":"- \/ - \/ -","offer_id":51641051250961,"sku":"","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true},{"title":"US \/ NEW \/ INGRAM","offer_id":51641051578641,"sku":"NIN9789811221064","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false},{"title":"GB \/ NEW \/ INGRAM","offer_id":52680116175121,"sku":"NLS9789811221064","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0784\/4072\/6801\/files\/9811221065.jpg?v=1750936233"},{"product_id":"repeated-games-with-incomplete-information-book-robert-j-aumann-9780262011471","title":"Repeated Games with Incomplete Information","description":"\u003cb\u003eDuring the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler, and Richard Stearns collaborated on researchon the dynamics of arms control negotiations that has since become foundational to work on repeated games. These five seminal papers are collected here for the first time, with the addition of postscripts describing many of the developments since the papers were written. \u003c\/b\u003e\u003cp\u003eDuring the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler, and Richard Stearns collaborated on research on the dynamics of arms control negotiations that has since become foundational to work on repeated games. These five seminal papers are collected here for the first time, with the addition of postscripts describing many of the developments since the papers were written. The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others. The original work, done under contract to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was intended to tackle the gradual disarmament problem, in which neither player knew what his own payoff would be for any given agreement, because of uncertainty about the other side's arsenal and weapons production technology. But the research soon became much more generalized, covering information concealment and revelation, signaling and learning, and related ideas in any repeated competitive situation. The first four chapters of the book treat the competitive zero-sum side of the theory of repeated games. Chapter five takes up cooperative phenomena where one player may want to signal information to another. An extensive bibliography covers all items mentioned in the main text, in the postscripts, and in the introduction. The bibliography also includes a compilation of published papers and books that refer to the original reports.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"WoB","offers":[{"title":"- \/ - \/ -","offer_id":51797166555409,"sku":null,"price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true},{"title":"US \/ GOOD \/ SBYB","offer_id":51797167112465,"sku":"CIN0262011476G","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":false}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0784\/4072\/6801\/files\/9780262011471.jpg?v=1752154571"},{"product_id":"repeated-games-with-incomplete-information-book-robert-j-aumann-9780262526265","title":"Repeated Games with Incomplete Information","description":"\u003cb\u003eDuring the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler, and Richard Stearns collaborated on researchon the dynamics of arms control negotiations that has since become foundational to work on repeated games. 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The bibliography also includes a compilation of published papers and books that refer to the original reports.\u003c\/p\u003e","brand":"WoB","offers":[{"title":"GB \/ NEW \/ INGRAM","offer_id":52687303639313,"sku":"NLS9780262526265","price":0.0,"currency_code":"GBP","in_stock":true}],"thumbnail_url":"\/\/cdn.shopify.com\/s\/files\/1\/0784\/4072\/6801\/files\/9780262526265.jpg?v=1762330132"}],"url":"https:\/\/www.worldofbooks.com\/en-gb\/collections\/author-books-by-robert-j-aumann.oembed","provider":"World of Books ","version":"1.0","type":"link"}