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The theory is developed as generally as possible, covering classes of aggregation methods that include such well-known examples as majority and unanimity rule and focusing in particular on the extent to which any aggregation method is assured to yield a set of \"best\" alternatives. The book is intended both as a contribution to the theory of collective choice and a pedagogic tool. Austen-Smith and Banks have made the exposition both rigorous and accessible to people with some technical background (e.g., a course in multivariate calculus). The intended readership ranges from more technically-oriented graduate students and specialists to those students in economics and political science interested less in the technical aspects of the results than in the depth, scope, and importance of the theoretical advances in positive political theory. \"This is a stunning book. 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McGann brings together the often antagonistic literature on normative political philosophy, social choice, and the empirical study of political institutions to show that it is possible to provide answers for many outstanding problems prevalent in all three.  “This ranks with Riker and Mackie as one of the most important works in democratic theory of the last thirty years. McGann slices through fashionable nonsense like a knife through hot butter.” --Iain McLean, Oxford University  “McGann brings a variety of theoretical arguments together to provide a coherent logic of majoritarian democracy and a wholehearted and comprehensive defense of majority rule. Notably, he finds virtue in what is commonly viewed as majority rule's vice — namely cycling — and he also shows that proportional representation, not first-past-the-post, is required for true majoritarianism. The book should be read not just by formal theorists but by a broad range of political science scholars and students.” --Nicholas R. Miller, University of Maryland  “In The Logic of Democracy Anthony McGann practices political science the way it should be done. He takes a difficult and important theoretical question, namely how we should interpret the possibility of majority-rule cycling, pursues it single-mindedly across the unhelpful barriers raised by established subspecialties and methodologies, and arrives at a set of non-obvious normative and empirical results. Will you agree with every argument he advances? Surely not. 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