The Sanctions Paradox by Daniel W Drezner
Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.
'The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990sIt offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favourite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come.' John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
Drezner, Daniel W.: - Daniel W. Drezner is professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a regular contributor to the Washington Post. He is the father of two former toddlers, both of whom were more mature than President Trump.
| SKU | Non disponible |
| ISBN 13 | 9780521644150 |
| ISBN 10 | 0521644151 |
| Titre | The Sanctions Paradox |
| Auteur | Daniel W Drezner |
| Série | Cambridge Studies In International Relations |
| État | Non disponible |
| Type de reliure | Paperback |
| Éditeur | Cambridge University Press |
| Année de publication | 1999-08-26 |
| Nombre de pages | 364 |
| Note de couverture | La photo du livre est présentée à titre d'illustration uniquement. La reliure, la couverture ou l'édition réelle peuvent varier. |
| Note | Non disponible |