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Answering Moral Skepticism Shelly Kagan (Clark Professor of Philosophy, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University)

Answering Moral Skepticism By Shelly Kagan (Clark Professor of Philosophy, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University)

Answering Moral Skepticism by Shelly Kagan (Clark Professor of Philosophy, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University)

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Answering Moral Skepticism Summary

Answering Moral Skepticism by Shelly Kagan (Clark Professor of Philosophy, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University)

Most thoughtful people worry at one time or another about whether there can actually be such a thing as objective moral truth. They might wonder, for example, whether the prevalence of moral disagreement makes it reasonable to conclude that there aren't really any moral facts at all. Or they might be bothered by questions like these: What could objective moral facts possibly be like? Isn't it obvious that morality is simply relative to particular societies and particular times? If there were moral facts, how could we ever come to know anything about them? Can morality really have the motivating and rational force we normally take it to have? How can one possibly find a place for objective moral values in a scientific worldview? Some people are driven by questions like these to the conclusion that we should embrace skepticism about morality, denying the very existence of anything worthy of the name. In Answering Moral Skepticism, Shelly Kagan shows how those who accept the existence of objective moral truth can provide plausible answers to these questions. Focusing throughout on issues that trouble reflective individuals, Kagan provides an accessible defense of the belief in objective morality will be of interest to both students of metaethics as well as anyone worried about the objectivity of their own moral judgements.

About Shelly Kagan (Clark Professor of Philosophy, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University)

Shelly Kagan is the Clark Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. A popular lecturer at Yale, Kagan's lectures on death have been watched online by millions of people around the world, and a book based on the course, Death, has been a national best seller in both S. Korea and Japan. His recent books include How to Count Animals, More or Less (OUP 2019) and The Geometry of Desert (OUP 2012).

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments A Note to the Reader Introduction 1. What Would Morality Need to Be? 1.1 Job Descriptions 1.2 Possible Elements 1.3 Satisfying the Job Description 2. Basic Positions in Metaethics 2.1 Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism 2.2 Nihilism vs. Moral Realism 2.3 Varieties of Moral Realism 2.4 Moral Skepticism 3. Nihilism 3.1 The Nature of Nihilism 3.2 The Case for Nihilism 3.3 Disregarding the Arguments 3.4 Normative Nihilism 4. Noncognitivism 4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism 4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism 4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism 5. Disagreement 5.1 The Argument from Disagreement 5.2 The Implications of Disagreement 5.3 Explaining Moral Disagreement 5.4 Nonconvergence 6. Relativism 6.1 Moral Relativism 6.2 Clarifying Relativism 6.3 Arguing for Relativism 6.4 Relativized Foundational Theories 7. Knowledge 7.1 The Analogy to Observation 7.2 Appearances 7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions 7.4 Reliability 7.5 Intuitionism 8. Evolution 8.1 The Argument from Evolution 8.2 A Second Try 8.3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics 8.4 Common Ground 8.5 The Continuity Problem 8.6 Path Dependence 9. Explanation 9.1 A Metaphysical Test 9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts 9.3 Reduction and Explanation 9.4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts 9.5 The Unrestricted Test 10. Motivation 10.1 Motive Internalism 10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism 10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism 10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation 10.5 The Direction of Fit 11. Reasons 11.1 Reasons Internalism 11.2 Reasons 11.3 Refining the Argument 11.4 Hypothetical Reasons 11.5 Rational Support 11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation 12. Reductionism 12.1 The Appeal of Reductionism 12.2 The Nature of Reduction 12.3 The Open Question Argument 12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind 12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction 12.6 Reducing Reasons 13. Simple Realism 13.1 Simple Normative Realism 13.2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity 13.3 Nonnatural Properties 13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals 14. Moral Realism 14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic 14.2 Systematic Moral Theory Notes References Index

Additional information

NGR9780197688984
9780197688984
0197688985
Answering Moral Skepticism by Shelly Kagan (Clark Professor of Philosophy, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University)
Shelly Kagan (Clark Professor of Philosophy, Clark Professor of Philosophy, Yale University)
New
Paperback
Oxford University Press Inc
2024-02-29
416
N/A
Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary.
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