Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022 provided an unwelcome reminder to many that war has not disappeared as a tool of statecraft, although most in Ukraine needed no reminding of that fact given that they first experienced Russian invasion in 2014. The ability of Ukraine to withstand the Russian attack, to inflict heavy casualties and later to liberate significant parts of their country caught many by surprise (not least the Russians). This book examines in detail the character and conduct of the war to date and offers important insight into the nature of modern war across all warfighting domains. The author explains how Ukraine has managed to break away from the limitations of old Soviet military culture to develop and sustain resilient fighting power. This is an important book for anyone who wishes to understand the current war in Ukraine. It will also be very useful to anyone interested in the evolution of war today and into the future, the central point about resilience has relevance far beyond Ukraine.
Ian Speller, Maynooth University, Ireland
'Although it might be too early to talk about lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, this book nonetheless gives us both a framework and content for understanding why Russia failed in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. These are two countries that share the same Soviet doctrinal past. Still, Ukraine has managed to take advantage of relevant conceptual lessons from the Soviet doctrine, Western best practices, and consequent NATO standardisation of the military for the requirements of modern warfare. Ukraine has learned and adapted. The book is structured in a manner to encourage learning. It is a must-read for academics, civilian and military practitioners who want to improve their understanding of both the war in Ukraine and warfare in general and the need for building resilience into ones society and military as a part of that. This is simply an outstanding and timely book that I highly recommend.'
Karl Erik Haug, Head of the Department of Modern History and Society, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Norway
'This book is both a timely and an important assessment of why Russia has failed to coerce and control Ukraine after its initial aggression in 2014 and subsequent large-scale invasion in February 2022. Fedorchak compares the Russian and Ukrainian military systems and approaches to warfare. She also explains how robust resilience has evolved to become an inherent characteristic of the Ukrainian state, military and society. The framework and concept of resilient fighting power is a key aspect of her analysis. Fedorchaks comprehensive book is an excellent early evaluation with many lessons to ponder for NATO and in fact all states neighbouring Russia.'
Col. (Retd) Per Erik Solli, Senior Defence Analyst, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Norway
'The Russian war against the Ukraine has been going on for 8 years and has gone through several phases. The last being the high-kinetic war since February 2022. The Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion has filled the world with admiration as well as brought strong material and vocal support. We have seen the use of new technology on a massive scale, but have at the same time witnessed an almost World War I fighting in Donbas. This book by Dr Fedorchak is an analysis of the experiences from this war. She lands in many interestning conclusions, several of them actually points in the direction of a return to concepts from the Cold War. It is for instance seen the return of mass armies combined with what has been called fifth generation warfare. This illustrates the need for a broad as well as deep understanding of warfare. The book also highlights the need for morale and civilian resilience, the importance of ingeniuity, military use of civilian resources and international support. The conclusions by Dr Fedorchak is an important contribution to the state of the art of warfare. It shows that war does not follow singlefile theory or general expectations. Instead, it calls for more comprehensive studies of the Russia-Ukraine war, to be used in future conflicts.'
Fredrik Eriksson, Assistant Professor Military History, Swedish Defence University, Sweden
