Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities by Paul Weirich
An agent often does not have precise probabilities or utilities to guide resolution of a decision problem. I advance a principle of rationality for making decisions in such cases. To begin, I represent the doxastic and conative state of an agent with a set of pairs of a probability assignment and a utility assignment. Then I support a decision principle that allows any act that maximizes expected utility according to some pair of assignments in the set. Assuming that computation of an option's expected utility uses comprehensive possible outcomes that include the option's risk, no consideration supports a stricter requirement.- Rational Attitudes to Risk
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Judgment Aggregation
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Epistemic Game Theory
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Small Probabilities and High Stakes
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Opinion Pooling
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Rationality and Time Bias
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Preference Change
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Beyond Uncertainty
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The History and Methodology of Expected Utility
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The Measurement of Subjective Probability
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Evidential Decision Theory
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Dutch Book Arguments
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Evolutionary Game Theory
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Commitment and Resoluteness in Rational Choice
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Money-Pump Arguments
| SKU | Unavailable |
| ISBN 13 | 9781108713504 |
| ISBN 10 | 1108713505 |
| Title | Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities |
| Author | Paul Weirich |
| Series | Elements In Decision Theory And Philosophy |
| Condition | Unavailable |
| Binding Type | Paperback |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Year published | 2021-02-25 |
| Number of pages | 75 |
| Cover note | Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary. |
| Note | Unavailable |