
Targeting Civilians in War by Alexander B Downes
Accidental harm to civilians in warfare often becomes an occasion for public outrage, from citizens of both the victimized and the victimizing nation. In this vitally important book on a topic of acute concern for anyone interested in military...-
Covert Regime Change
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Corporate Warriors
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Why Intelligence Fails
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Bombing to Win
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Weapons of Mass Migration
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Final Solutions
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Myths of Empire
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Conventional Deterrence
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Crucible of Beliefs
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Nuclear Statecraft
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The Peace of Illusions
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Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers
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Alliance Politics
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The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution
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Living Weapons
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The Transformation of American Air Power
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Warlords
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Liddell Hart and the Weight of History
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Twilight of the Titans
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Balancing Risks
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Taking Territory
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The Remnants of War
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The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy
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Dilemmas of Appeasement
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Retrench, Defend, Compete
"This is a magnificent work and towering achievementWith both innovative historical studies and comprehensive statistical analysis, Downes powerfully demonstrates an original and disturbing thesis—that democracies are just as likely as autocracies to target civilians in war, and even more so when they fear that they will lose. All scholars of international security and military history should read this book, and we would all benefit if policy advisors did also."—James Kurth, Claude Smith Professor of Political Science, Swarthmore College
"This is a powerful and disturbing study of the dark side of democracy. 'Democratic Peace Theory' has shown that democracies rarely fight each other. Alexander B. Downes demonstrates, however, that when democracies do go to war, they often fight with their gloves off, ignoring principles of noncombatant immunity."—Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University
"In twenty years, people wanting to understand the critically important subject of civilian victimization will turn to this book. Alexander B. Downes argues that the decision to victimize civilians depends primarily on the strategic incentives to do so, regardless of whether the countries involved are democratic. Downes also finds that factors relating to 'identity'—whether the enemy is a different race or culture—are also insignificant. Targeting Civilians in War will become a classic in the field of security studies."—Daryl G. Press, Dartmouth College, author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats
"This is a powerful and disturbing study of the dark side of democracy. 'Democratic Peace Theory' has shown that democracies rarely fight each other. Alexander B. Downes demonstrates, however, that when democracies do go to war, they often fight with their gloves off, ignoring principles of noncombatant immunity."—Scott D. Sagan, Stanford University
"In twenty years, people wanting to understand the critically important subject of civilian victimization will turn to this book. Alexander B. Downes argues that the decision to victimize civilians depends primarily on the strategic incentives to do so, regardless of whether the countries involved are democratic. Downes also finds that factors relating to 'identity'—whether the enemy is a different race or culture—are also insignificant. Targeting Civilians in War will become a classic in the field of security studies."—Daryl G. Press, Dartmouth College, author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats
Alexander B. Downes, a winner of the Helen Dwight Reid Award, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duke University.
| SKU | Unavailable |
| ISBN 13 | 9780801478376 |
| ISBN 10 | 0801478375 |
| Title | Targeting Civilians in War |
| Author | Alexander B Downes |
| Series | Cornell Studies In Security Affairs |
| Condition | Unavailable |
| Binding Type | Paperback |
| Publisher | Cornell University Press |
| Year published | 2012-08-28 |
| Number of pages | 328 |
| Prizes | Winner of Winner of the Lepgold Book Prize (Georgetown Unive. |
| Cover note | Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary. |
| Note | Unavailable |
























