Election Timing

Election Timing

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Summary

The author proposes an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. He explains why leaders find it difficult to profit from their ability to call elections when they are popular and the opposition is weak.

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Election Timing by Alastair Smith

Endogenous election timing allows leaders to schedule elections 'when the time is right'. The author proposes and tests an informational theory of endogenous election timing that explains when leaders call for elections and the consequences of their decisions. In particular, he argues that, if all else is equal, leaders announce elections when they anticipate a decline in their future performance. As a consequence, early elections signal a leader's lack of confidence in future outcomes. The earlier elections occur, relative to expectations, the stronger the signal of demise. Using data on British parliaments since 1945, the author tests hypotheses related to timing of elections, electoral support and subsequent economic performance. Leaders who call elections early (relative to expectations) experience a decline in their popular support relative to pre-announcement levels, experience worse post-electoral performance, and have shorter campaigns.
SKU Unavailable
ISBN 13 9780521833639
ISBN 10 0521833639
Title Election Timing
Author Alastair Smith
Series Political Economy Of Institutions And Decisions
Condition Unavailable
Binding Type Hardback
Publisher Cambridge University Press
Year published 2004-07-19
Number of pages 286
Cover note Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary.