Having It Both Ways by Guy Fletcher
A recent trend in metaethics has been to reject the apparent choice between pure cognitivism, where moral (and other normative) judgments are understood as representational or belief-like states, and pure non-cognitivism, where they are understood as non-representational or desire-like states. Rather, philosophers have adopted views which seek in some way to combine the strengths of each side while avoiding the standard problems for each. Some such views claim that moral judgments are complexes of belief-like and desire-like components. Other views claim that normative language serves both to ascribe properties and to express desire-like attitudes. This collection of twelve new essays examines the prospects for such 'hybrid views' of normative thought and language. The papers, which focus mainly on moral thought and talk, provide a guide to this debate while also pushing it forward along numerous fronts.
The variety, breadth, and depth of these essays make the collection well worth exploringMetaethics has always drawn from other areas of philosophy to make progress, and in this volume you can see that in spades. The emphasis is in using recent developments in the philosophy of language and mind to open the door to new ways of conceiving of moral discourse. It would be unreasonable to expect to find any finished hybrid theories here, as the contributors are still working out the details, but it would be even more unreasonable to ignore the progress being made. * Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online *
Guy Fletcher is British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow and Lecturer at the University of Edinburgh. Michael Ridge is Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh.
| SKU | Unavailable |
| ISBN 13 | 9780199347582 |
| ISBN 10 | 0199347581 |
| Title | Having It Both Ways |
| Author | Guy Fletcher |
| Series | Oxford Moral Theory |
| Condition | Unavailable |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press Inc |
| Year published | 2015-01-08 |
| Number of pages | 320 |
| Cover note | Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary. |
| Note | Unavailable |