Incentives and Political Economy by The Late Jean-Jacques Laffont

Incentives and Political Economy by The Late Jean-Jacques Laffont

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Summary

'Incentives and Political Economy' constructs a normative approach to constitutional design using developments in contract theory. It treats political economy as the study of the incentive problems created by the delegation of Politicians are treated successively as informed supervisors or residual decision-makers.

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Incentives and Political Economy by The Late Jean-Jacques Laffont

Laffont examines the incentive problems created by delegating economic policy to self-interested politicians and the blurry line between flexibility of decision-making and discretion to pursue personal agendas.
Review from previous edition deals with the subject in a refreshing piecemeal approach that will allow researchers to embed elements of the theory into their favourite political economy models* Aslib Book Guide, Vol.65, Aug. 2000. *
Jean-Jacques Laffont is Professor of Economics at the University of Toulouse and director of the Institut d'Economie Industrielle (IDEI). His recent research focuses on regulation, political economy, and development. Winner of the Yrjö Jahnsson award in 1993, he was President of the Econometric Society in 1992 and President of the European Economic Association in 1998.
SKU Unavailable
ISBN 13 9780199248681
ISBN 10 0199248680
Title Incentives and Political Economy
Author The Late Jean-Jacques Laffont
Series Clarendon Lectures In Economics
Condition Unavailable
Binding Type Paperback
Publisher Oxford University Press
Year published 2001-10-18
Number of pages 272
Cover note Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary.