Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress
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Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress by Thomas Nagel
This volume presents two closely related essays by Thomas Nagel: Gut Feelings and Moral Knowledge and Moral Reality and Moral Progress. Both essays are concerned with moral epistemology and our means of access to moral truth; both are concerned with moral realism and with the resistance to subjectivist and reductionist accounts of morality; and both are concerned with the historical development of moral knowledge. The second essay also proposes an account of the historical development of moral truth, according to which it does not share the timelessness of scientific truth. This is because moral truth must be based on reasons that are accessible to the individuals to whom they apply, and such accessibility depends on historical developments. The result is that only some advances in moral knowledge are discoveries of what has been true all along.
It is deep, reflective, and deals with worrying questions such as our understanding of the past, and the sense in which there is moral progress...In spite of its short length, this book traverses an enormous amount of difficult ground. * Simon Blackburn, Society *
I highly recommend reading and thereby enjoying this wonderful little book. * Paul Bloomfield, Society *
Slim but philosophically weighty volume. * John Cottingham, Society *
Nagel has given us a concise and rigorous work that grapples with the deepest philosophical issues. * Richard Kraut, Society *
Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress brings together two short pieces,... in a light, handbag-friendly volume. * Jessie Munton, TLS *
This new book by Thomas Nagel consists of two essays on morality...Nagel's two essays are a welcome contribution to the growing discussion of moral progress. They provide guidance for those who wish to develop an account of moral progress based on a theory of reasons. * David Lambie, Metascience *
This new book by Thomas Nagel consists of two essays on morality...Nagel's two essays are a welcome contribution to the growing discussion of moral progress. They provide guidance for those who wish to develop an account of moral progress based on a theory of reasons. * David Lambie, Metascience *
I highly recommend reading and thereby enjoying this wonderful little book. * Paul Bloomfield, Society *
Slim but philosophically weighty volume. * John Cottingham, Society *
Nagel has given us a concise and rigorous work that grapples with the deepest philosophical issues. * Richard Kraut, Society *
Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress brings together two short pieces,... in a light, handbag-friendly volume. * Jessie Munton, TLS *
This new book by Thomas Nagel consists of two essays on morality...Nagel's two essays are a welcome contribution to the growing discussion of moral progress. They provide guidance for those who wish to develop an account of moral progress based on a theory of reasons. * David Lambie, Metascience *
This new book by Thomas Nagel consists of two essays on morality...Nagel's two essays are a welcome contribution to the growing discussion of moral progress. They provide guidance for those who wish to develop an account of moral progress based on a theory of reasons. * David Lambie, Metascience *
Thomas Nagel is University Professor Emeritus in the Department of Philosophy and the School of Law at NYU. His extensive writings deal with ethics, political theory, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and the meaning of life. Among his books are The View from Nowhere and Mind and Cosmos.
| SKU | Unavailable |
| ISBN 13 | 9780197690888 |
| ISBN 10 | 0197690882 |
| Title | Moral Feelings, Moral Reality, and Moral Progress |
| Author | Thomas Nagel |
| Condition | Unavailable |
| Binding Type | Hardback |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press Inc |
| Year published | 2023-12-06 |
| Number of pages | 80 |
| Cover note | Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary. |
| Note | Unavailable |