Rich Experience and Sparse Awareness by Ariel Meir Berlinger
Consciousness is often treated as unitary phenomenon. We challenge this and propose a framework that parses it into two functionally distinct representational media. Reviewing dominant theories, as well as studies of perceptual failures, neural activity, visual search and attention – we argue that phenomenal experience arises early as a detailed, analogue, and relatively generic representation of the physical world. Awareness, a later and more idiosyncratic representation of the world, results from enriching phenomenal experience via relevance-filtered semantic knowledge. This Multi-Representational Media (MRM) account unifies perception, memory, and cognition, reconciles rich and sparse consciousness views, and reframes concepts in unconscious cognition research.-
Attentional Selection
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Crossmodal Attention Applied
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Constructing Experience
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The Breadth of Visual Attention
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Attending to Moving Objects
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Representing Variability
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Action Understanding
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Multisensory Interactions in the Real World
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Hypothesis Testing Reconsidered
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Visual-vestibular Integration in Challenging Environments
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Visual Control of Locomotion
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Competition and Control during Working Memory
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Elements of Scene Perception
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Empathy
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The Pervasiveness of Ensemble Perception
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Melanopsin Vision
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Ecological Psychology
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The Expertise of Perception
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Chemical Senses in Feeding, Belonging, and Surviving
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Perception and Action in a Social Context
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Human Color Vision and Tetrachromacy
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Physiological Influences of Music in Perception and Action
| SKU | Unavailable |
| ISBN 13 | 9781009757102 |
| ISBN 10 | 1009757105 |
| Title | Rich Experience and Sparse Awareness |
| Author | Ariel Meir Berlinger |
| Series | Elements In Perception |
| Condition | Unavailable |
| Binding Type | Hardback |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Year published | 2026-06-30 |
| Cover note | Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary. |
| Note | Unavailable |