The Structure of Justification by Robert Audi
This collection of papers by one of the foremost philosophers in epistemology transcends two of the most widely misunderstood positions in philosophy - foundationalism and coherentism. Audi proposes a distinctively moderate, internalist foundationalism that incorporates some of the virtues of both coherentism and reliabilism. He develops important distinctions between positive and negative epistemic dependence, substantively and conceptually naturalistic theories, dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe, episodically and structurally inferential beliefs, first and second order internalism, and rebutting as opposed to refuting scepticism. These contrasts are applied not only to rational belief, but to rational action and the rationality of desires and intentions. The overall position is a pluralist, moderately rationalistic, internalist theory of justification and a partly externalist conception of knowledge. However, by virtue of offering a theory of rationality as well as an account of knowledge and justified belief, it will interest philosophers of ethics, science, and the social sciences and teachers and students of epistemology.
"His grasp of modern (analytical) American epistemology is striking... This new book is a notable one by a noted philosopher." Canadian Philosophical Reviews
Charles J. Audi is Robert Audi. University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Mach Distinguished Professor of Philosophy. The Structure of Justification (1993), Action, Intention, and Reason (1993), Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (Oxford, 1997), and The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (2nd Ed., 1999) are only a few of his publications.
| SKU | Unavailable |
| ISBN 13 | 9780521440646 |
| ISBN 10 | 0521440645 |
| Title | The Structure of Justification |
| Author | Robert Audi |
| Condition | Unavailable |
| Binding Type | Hardback |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Year published | 1993-08-27 |
| Number of pages | 496 |
| Cover note | Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary. |
| Note | Unavailable |