
Deception and Self-Deception by Vladimir Krstić
Received theories of self-deception are problematic. The traditional view, according to which self-deceivers intend to deceive themselves, generates paradoxes: you cannot deceive yourself intentionally because you know your own plans and intentions. Non-traditional views argue that self-deceivers act intentionally but deceive themselves unintentionally or that self-deception is not intentional at all. The non-traditional approaches do not generate paradoxes, but they entail that people can deceive themselves by accident or by mistake, which is controversial. The author argues that a functional analysis of deception solves these problems. On the functional view, a certain thing is deceptive if and only if its function is to mislead; hence, while (self-)deception may but need not be intended, it is never accidental or a mistake. Also, self-deceivers need not benefit from deception and they need not end up with epistemically unjustified beliefs; rather, they must 'not be themselves'. Finally, self-deception need not be adaptive.- Knowledge-To in Classical Confucianism
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Justifying Memory
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An Anti-Sceptical Metaphysics and Epistemology of Perception
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Shifty Epistemology
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Reliabilism and its Rivals
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Sincerity and Insincerity
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The Nature and Normativity of Defeat
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Higher-Order Evidence and Calibrationism
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On Believing and Being Convinced
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Knowing What It Is Like
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The Indispensability of Intuitions
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Transcendental Epistemology
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The Epistemic Consequences of Paradox
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Philosophy, Bullshit, and Peer Review
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The Skeptic and the Veridicalist
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Stratified Virtue Epistemology
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Aesthetic Knowledge
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The Epistemology of Logic
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Disagreement
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Emotional Self-Knowledge
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Knowledge-First Epistemology
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Knowledge and God
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The A Priori without Magic
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Defining Knowledge
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Foundationalism
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Wisdom
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Coherentism
| SKU | Unavailable |
| ISBN 13 | 9781009509770 |
| ISBN 10 | 1009509772 |
| Title | Deception and Self-Deception |
| Author | Vladimir Krsti? |
| Series | Elements In Epistemology |
| Condition | Unavailable |
| Binding Type | Hardback |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Year published | 2025-07-31 |
| Number of pages | 75 |
| Cover note | Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary. |
| Note | Unavailable |

























