
Disagreement by Diego E Machuca
This Element engages with the epistemic significance of disagreement, focusing on its skeptical implications. It examines various types of disagreement-motivated skepticism in ancient philosophy, ethics, philosophy of religion, and general epistemology. In each case, it favors suspension of judgment as the seemingly appropriate response to the realization of disagreement. One main line of argument pursued in the Element is that, since in real-life disputes we have limited or inaccurate information about both our own epistemic standing and the epistemic standing of our dissenters, personal information and self-trust can rarely function as symmetry breakers in favor of our own views.- Knowledge-To in Classical Confucianism
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Justifying Memory
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An Anti-Sceptical Metaphysics and Epistemology of Perception
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Shifty Epistemology
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Reliabilism and its Rivals
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Sincerity and Insincerity
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The Nature and Normativity of Defeat
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Higher-Order Evidence and Calibrationism
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On Believing and Being Convinced
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Knowing What It Is Like
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The Indispensability of Intuitions
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Transcendental Epistemology
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The Epistemic Consequences of Paradox
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Philosophy, Bullshit, and Peer Review
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The Skeptic and the Veridicalist
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Stratified Virtue Epistemology
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Aesthetic Knowledge
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The Epistemology of Logic
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Deception and Self-Deception
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Emotional Self-Knowledge
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Knowledge-First Epistemology
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Knowledge and God
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The A Priori without Magic
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Defining Knowledge
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Foundationalism
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Wisdom
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Coherentism
| SKU | Unavailable |
| ISBN 13 | 9781009539289 |
| ISBN 10 | 1009539280 |
| Title | Disagreement |
| Author | Diego E Machuca |
| Series | Elements In Epistemology |
| Condition | Unavailable |
| Binding Type | Hardback |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Year published | 2024-12-19 |
| Number of pages | 76 |
| Cover note | Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary. |
| Note | Unavailable |

























