
Persistence by Kristie Miller
Persistence realism is the view that ordinary sentences that we think and utter about persisting objects are often true. Persistence realism involves both a semantic claim, about what it would take for those sentences to be true, and an ontological claim about the way things are. According to persistence realism, given what it would take for persistence sentences to be true, and given the ontology of our world, often such sentences are true. According to persistence error-theory, they are not. This Element considers several different views about the conditions under which those sentences are true. It argues for a view on which it is relatively easy to vindicate persistence realism, because all it takes is for the world to be the way it seems to us. Thereby it argues for the view that relations of numerical identity, or of being-part-of-the-same-object, are neither necessary nor sufficient for persistence realism.-
The Methodology of Metaphysics
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The Metaphysics of Logic
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Metaphysics of Causation
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Metaphysics and the Sciences
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Metaphysics of Race
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Abstract Objects
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Grounding, Fundamentality and Ultimate Explanations
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The Metaphysics of Gender
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Relations
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Properties
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Substance
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Chemistry's Metaphysics
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Modal Naturalism
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The Metaphysics of Color
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Social Ontology
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Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics
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Metaontology
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Reduction, Emergence and the Metaphysics in Science
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Indeterminacy in the World
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Ontological Categories
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Dispositions and Powers
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Teleology
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Identity
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Truthmaking
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Formal Ontology
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Parts and Wholes
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Laws of Nature
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Material Objects
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Essence
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Metaphysical Realism and Anti-Realism
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Time
| SKU | Unavailable |
| ISBN 13 | 9781009056007 |
| ISBN 10 | 100905600X |
| Title | Persistence |
| Author | Kristie Miller |
| Series | Elements In Metaphysics |
| Condition | Unavailable |
| Binding Type | Paperback |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Year published | 2022-08-11 |
| Number of pages | 75 |
| Cover note | Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary. |
| Note | Unavailable |






























