
Relations by John Heil
Historically, philosophical discussions of relations have featured chiefly as afterthoughts, loose ends to be addressed only after coming to terms with more important and pressing metaphysical issues. F. H. Bradley stands out as an exception. Understanding Bradley's views on relations and their significance today requires an appreciation of the alternatives, which in turn requires an understanding of how relations have traditionally been classified and how philosophers have struggled to capture their nature and their ontological standing. Positions on these topics range from the rejection of relations altogether, to their being awarded the status as grounds for everything else, to various intermediary positions along this spectrum. Love them, hate them, or merely tolerate them, no philosopher engaged in ontologically serious metaphysics can afford to ignore relations.-
The Methodology of Metaphysics
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The Metaphysics of Logic
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Metaphysics of Causation
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Metaphysics and the Sciences
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Metaphysics of Race
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Abstract Objects
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Grounding, Fundamentality and Ultimate Explanations
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The Metaphysics of Gender
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Persistence
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Properties
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Substance
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Chemistry's Metaphysics
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Modal Naturalism
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The Metaphysics of Color
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Social Ontology
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Neo-Aristotelian Metaphysics
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Metaontology
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Reduction, Emergence and the Metaphysics in Science
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Indeterminacy in the World
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Ontological Categories
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Dispositions and Powers
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Teleology
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Identity
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Truthmaking
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Formal Ontology
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Parts and Wholes
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Laws of Nature
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Material Objects
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Essence
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Metaphysical Realism and Anti-Realism
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Time
| SKU | Unavailable |
| ISBN 13 | 9781108940610 |
| ISBN 10 | 1108940617 |
| Title | Relations |
| Author | John Heil |
| Series | Elements In Metaphysics |
| Condition | Unavailable |
| Binding Type | Paperback |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| Year published | 2021-11-11 |
| Number of pages | 75 |
| Cover note | Book picture is for illustrative purposes only, actual binding, cover or edition may vary. |
| Note | Unavailable |






























